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PATHOLOGIZING “RADICALIZATION” 
AND THE EROSION OF PATIENT  
PRIVACY RIGHTS 
Abstract: Countering Violent Extremism (“CVE”) is a counterterrorism strategy 
ostensibly aimed at preventing “radicalization” through risk assessment and inter-
vention. CVE involves recruitment of helping professionals, including mental 
health care providers, to monitor their patients for signs of “vulnerability to radical-
ization,” make referrals to “de-radicalization” programs, and participate in multi-
disciplinary intervention teams. Broad national security and public safety excep-
tions within existing privacy laws allow mental health professionals participating in 
CVE to make potentially harmful disclosures of private patient information. This 
Note argues that professional associations representing mental health care provid-
ers should develop policies to limit and regulate members’ participation in CVE. 
INTRODUCTION 
Mahin Khan (“Khan”) is an autistic Muslim eighteen-year-old currently 
serving an eight-year sentence in Arizona state prison.1 In July 2016, Khan was 
charged with plotting to commit terrorism in support of the Taliban and the 
Islamic State.2 Khan first came into contact with the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation (FBI) when he was fifteen, after he sent a threatening letter to a teach-
er.3 He subsequently underwent a forty-five day evaluation in an inpatient psy-
chiatric facility, arranged in part by the FBI.4 Over the next few years, the FBI 
met with Khan every few months under the pretense of mentoring him and 
coordinating his mental health care.5 During one of these meetings, authorities 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Phil Benson, Mahin Khan Sentenced to 8 Years in Prison in Tucson Terrorism Case, AZFAMI-
LY.COM (Nov. 4, 2016), http://www.azfamily.com/story/33630479/mahin-khan-sentenced-to-8-years-in-
prison-in-tucson-terrorism-case [https://perma.cc/S2TU-C5U8]; Murtaza Hussain, 18-Year-Old Arrested 
on Terrorism Charges Is Mentally “Like a Child,” INTERCEPT (Aug. 3, 2016), https://theintercept.
com/2016/08/03/18-year-old-arrested-on-terrorism-charges-is-mentally-like-a-child/ [https://perma.cc/
P47C-RFS2]; Mike Truelsen, Parents of Tucson Terrorism Suspect Mahin Khan Release Statement; Ask 
for ‘Understanding,’ NEWS 4 TUCSON (Aug. 4, 2016), http://www.kvoa.com/story/32501286/parents-of-
tucson-terrorism-suspect-mahin-khan-release-statement-ask-for-understanding [https://perma.cc/DN6V-
5BU4]. 
 2 Hussain, supra note 1. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. It is unclear from news reports how the Federal Bureau of Investigation first became aware 
of Mahin Khan (“Khan”) and the extent of communications between Khan’s treating mental health 
care providers and law enforcement officials. See id. 
 5 Id.; see Truelsen, supra note 1 (quoting Khan’s parents’ statement indicating that they had co-
operated with the FBI for the purpose of helping their son access mental health services). 
792 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:791 
provided Khan with a cell phone.6 Using this phone, Khan allegedly made 
statements to an undercover informant indicating his willingness to commit 
terrorism.7 
Two weeks after Khan turned eighteen, he was charged as an adult with 
conspiracy to commit terrorism and conspiracy to commit misconduct involv-
ing weapons.8 At Khan’s trial, his parents argued that their son had the mental 
capacity of a thirteen-year-old and was incapable of formulating the complex 
plot he was accused of, let alone carrying it out.9 Unpersuaded by this argu-
ment, an Arizona state court judge sentenced Khan to eight years in prison and 
lifetime probation.10 
Khan is just one of several mentally ill or developmentally disabled 
young Muslim men who have been subjects of surveillance and high-profile 
prosecutions since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks (“9/11”).11 These 
cases show a correlation between terrorism-related criminal prosecutions and 
mental illness or developmental disabilities.12 Researchers have relied on this 
correlation in attempting to identify a causal link between behavioral and psy-
chological indicators and terrorism.13 
                                                                                                                           
 6 Hussain, supra note 1. Khan’s parents had refused to buy him a phone, believing he lacked the 
necessary maturity. Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Press Release, Arizona Attorney General, Mahin Khan Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charges 
(Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.azag.gov/press-release/mahin-khan-pleads-guilty-terrorism-charges 
[https://perma.cc/QX7Y-SEG6]. While the FBI’s investigation began at least four months before 
Khan turned eighteen, he was not arrested until two weeks after his birthday. Hussain, supra note 1. 
 9 Hussain, supra note 1; Truelsen, supra note 1. 
 10 Benson, supra note 1. While awaiting his sentencing in Arizona’s Maricopa County jail, Khan 
was reportedly kept in solitary confinement due to attacks by other inmates and the nature of the 
charges against him. Andrew Blankstein & Eli Panken, Arizona Terror Suspect Mahin Khan Attacked 
by Inmates in Jail: Officials, NBC NEWS (July 16, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/
arizona-terror-suspect-mahin-khan-attacked-inmates-prison-officials-n610891 [https://perma.cc/
GJM8-33GU]. 
 11 See TREVOR AARONSON, THE TERROR FACTORY: INSIDE THE FBI’S MANUFACTURED WAR 
ON TERRORISM 157–58 (2013) (discussing how the lack of oversight of FBI undercover operations 
results in the targeting of “people who lack the capacity—financial or mental—to commit serious 
crimes”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & HUMAN RIGHTS INST. AT COLUMBIA LAW SCH., ILLUSION OF 
JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN US TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS 27–41 (2014) (documenting 
allegations of terrorism that involved high levels of FBI undercover involvement, including several 
cases in which individuals targeted by the FBI suffered from mental illness or developmental disabili-
ties); Trevor Aaronson, The Sting: How the FBI Created a Terrorist, INTERCEPT (Mar. 16, 2015), 
https://theintercept.com/2015/03/16/howthefbicreatedaterrorist/ [https://perma.cc/8LWL-7A3V] (de-
scribing the prosecution of Sami Osmakac, a mentally ill man arrested for attempting to plant a car 
bomb provided by undercover FBI informants). 
 12 See AARONSON, supra note 11; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & HUMAN RIGHTS INST. AT COLUM-
BIA LAW SCH., supra note 11. 
 13 See, e.g., Randy Borum, Psychological Vulnerabilities and Propensities for Involvement in 
Violent Extremism, 32 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 286, 287 (2014) (providing an overview of attempts to iden-
tify links between mental illness and terrorism and proposing that “mindset” impacts propensity to 
engage in terrorism); Paul Gill & Emily Corner, There and Back Again: The Study of Mental Disorder 
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Countering Violent Extremism (“CVE”) is a preventive counter-terrorism 
strategy deployed in the War on Terror.14 Rather than focusing solely on mili-
tary responses, governments around the world have incorporated political and 
social science methods into their national security policies.15 As a result of this 
embrace of a multidisciplinary approach to the War on Terror, CVE has ex-
panded worldwide.16 CVE is based on the assumption that there are identifia-
ble “radicalization” processes through which law-abiding individuals adopt 
“extreme” ideas that may motivate terrorist activity.17 CVE is also based on the 
                                                                                                                           
and Terrorist Involvement, 72 AM. PSYCHOL. 231, 232–36 (2017) (providing a forty-year “history of 
the study of mental disorders and the terrorist”); Stevan M. Weine & Heidi Ellis, Mobilize Health 
Resources to Counter Extremism, 45 FAM. PRAC. NEWS 17, 17 (2015) (arguing that “psychosocial 
struggles” are a key factor in “radicalization” processes). 
 14 See Kelly A. Berkell, Off-Ramp Opportunities in Material Support Cases, 8 HARV. NAT’L SEC. 
J. 1, 26–28 (2017) (providing an overview of international CVE programs run by governments and 
non-governmental organizations); Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Countering Vio-
lent Extremism Task Force (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/01/08/countering-violent-
extremism-task-force [https://perma.cc/926G-DMAN] (announcing the creation of a Countering Vio-
lent Extremism (“CVE”) Task Force by the Department of Homeland Security and Department of 
Justice). This Note uses the term “CVE” to refer to a broad category of programs, practices, and strat-
egies deployed by governments and organizations that involve attempts to prevent “radicalization” 
through risk assessment and intervention. See Sahar F. Aziz, Losing the “War of Ideas:” A Critique of 
Countering Violent Extremism Programs, 52 TEX. INT’L L. J. 255, 258–61 (2017). 
 15 See STEVAN WEINE ET AL., NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM & RESPONS-
ES TO TERRORISM, LESSONS LEARNED FROM MENTAL HEALTH AND EDUCATION: IDENTIFYING BEST 
PRACTICES FOR ADDRESSING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 4–11 (2015) (demonstrating the ways in which 
the counter-terrorism field has increasingly drawn on the expertise of mental health professionals); 
Khaled A. Beydoun, Between Indigence, Islamophobia, and Erasure: Poor and Muslim in “War on 
Terror” America, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1463, 1488 (2016) (discussing how CVE achieves legitimacy 
through building allegiances between law enforcement and religious and cultural institutions). 
 16 See NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: A GUIDE FOR 
PRACTITIONERS AND ANALYSTS 9–10 (2014) (discussing CVE in Saudi Arabia and Singapore); 
Berkell, supra note 14; U.N. Sec. Council Counter-Terrorism Comm., Countering Violent Extremism, 
https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/focus-areas/countering-violent-extremism/ [https://perma.cc/P8VD-R8D4] 
(discussing the United Nations’ CVE strategy). 
 17 See ARUN KUNDNANI, A DECADE LOST: RETHINKING RADICALISATION AND EXTREMISM 9–
13 (2015) (explaining the “radicalization” narrative underlying the UK’s CVE program “Prevent”); 
Amna Akbar, Policing “Radicalization,” 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 809, 811 (2013) (explaining how the 
idea of “[r]adicalization has transformed the landscape of preventive counterterrorism policing”); 
Aziz, supra note 14, at 258–59 (explaining that “stopping so-called ‘radicalization’ of individuals to 
engage in terrorism is the ultimate goal of CVE”); Berkell, supra note 14, at 4 (describing CVE as “a 
developing set of initiatives that identify and mitigate the factors that lead individuals to embrace and 
act upon violent ideologies, a process sometimes referred to as radicalization”). The terms “radicaliza-
tion” and “extremism” are used within this Note to refer to theories and beliefs about ideology and 
violence, recognizing that these terms have been critiqued for their lack of specificity and perpetuation 
of stereotypes. See Akbar, supra, at 816 (distinguishing between “radicalization” as a “discursive 
construct” and as an actual singular process); Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? The Law 
and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization, 64 STAN. L. REV. 125, 137 (2012) (stating that “‘counter-
radicalization’ remains almost completely undertheorized”). This Note has quotation marks around 
these terms to highlight their problematic implications. See Akbar, supra, at 816; Rascoff, supra. 
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assumption that there are ways of intervening at early stages of these processes 
to prevent future acts of terrorism.18 
CVE has two main functions.19 First, CVE includes a risk assessment func-
tion.20 Helping professionals involved in CVE risk assessment are tasked with 
monitoring individuals in their care for signs of “vulnerability to radicaliza-
tion.”21 Second, CVE includes an intervention function.22 Individuals identified 
as being “vulnerable to radicalization” are referred to teams of professionals 
from different disciplines—including mental health workers, teachers, imams, 
and law enforcement officials—for religious and ideological reprogramming.23 
Although Khan’s arrest does not appear to be directly linked to any offi-
cial CVE program, his case highlights the dangers of law enforcement interfer-
ence in mental health treatment.24 CVE is often promoted as a way of provid-
                                                                                                                           
 18 See NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., supra note 16, at 4 (describing CVE as encompassing 
“prevention,” “disruption,” and “disengagement” strategies); Sahar F. Aziz, Policing Terrorists in the 
Community, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 147, 164 (2014) (describing the purpose of preventive counter-
terrorism policies as “stop[ping] people from embracing extreme beliefs . . . that might lead to terror-
ism”); Berkell, supra note 14, at 39 (arguing that in some cases, security aims are best achieved 
through CVE as opposed to criminal prosecutions). 
 19 WEINE ET AL., supra note 15, at 2; Berkell, supra note 14, at 4. 
 20 John D. Cohen, The Next Generation of CVE Strategies at Home: Expanding Opportunities for 
Intervention, 668 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 118, 120 (2016); Kiran M. Sarma, Risk As-
sessment and the Prevention of Radicalization from Nonviolence into Terrorism, 72 AM. PSYCHOL. 
278, 280–81 (2017). 
 21 Akbar, supra note 17, at 814–15; Beydoun, supra note 15. 
 22 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTA-
TION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED 
STATES 11 (2016) [hereinafter STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN] (discussing the U.S. CVE inter-
vention prong); Berkell, supra note 14, at 37–39 (describing CVE’s risk assessment and intervention 
functions). 
 23 See HM GOVERNMENT, CHANNEL DUTY GUIDANCE PROTECTING VULNERABLE PEOPLE FROM 
BEING DRAWN INTO TERRORISM, 2015, at 15–18 (UK) [hereinafter CHANNEL DUTY GUIDANCE] 
(providing guidance to members of the UK’s “Channel panels” and their partners in CVE intervention 
methods); Rascoff, supra note 17, at 142 (explaining that CVE intervention techniques may include 
“inculcation of ‘mainstream’ religious beliefs”); Cora Currier & Murtaza Hussain, Letter Details FBI 
Plan for Secretive Anti-Radicalization Committees, INTERCEPT (Apr. 28, 2016), https://theintercept.
com/2016/04/28/letter-details-fbi-plan-for-secretive-anti-radicalization-committees/ [https://perma.
cc/94F6-NYFA] (discussing “Shared Responsibility Committees” which rely on counselors, social 
workers, religious figures, and other community members to assist the FBI in intervening with those 
the FBI thinks are in danger of “radicalizing”). 
 24 See OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ERODING TRUST: THE UK’S PREVENT COUNTER-
EXTREMISM STRATEGY IN HEALTH AND EDUCATION 15–18 (2016) (discussing how CVE has under-
mined relationships between helping professionals and those to whom they provide care in the UK); 
Beydoun, supra note 15 (describing how CVE policing techniques undermine First and Fourth 
Amendment rights); Hussain, supra note 1 (highlighting the fact that the FBI gained the trust of 
Khan’s family by helping him access mental health treatment); Alice LoCicero & J. Wesley Boyd, 
The Dangers of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Programs, PSYCHOL. TODAY (July 19, 2016), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/almost-addicted/201607/the-dangers-countering-violent-
extremism-cve-programs [https://perma.cc/BQV9-V2LY] (calling on psychologists to refuse to partic-
ipate in CVE due to ethical concerns). 
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ing “off-ramps” to vulnerable individuals before they ever reach the point of 
engaging in criminal activity.25 The use of the term “off-ramp” implies that 
CVE identifies and reroutes individuals on the path towards becoming “ex-
tremists,” keeping communities safe and minimizing prosecutions.26 In Khan’s 
case, however, the integration of mental health treatment and monitoring did 
not provide an off-ramp.27 Rather, it led to his prosecution, incarceration, and 
lifetime probation.28 
This Note addresses the privacy concerns CVE raises, particularly with 
respect to individuals like Khan who receive services relating to mental illness 
or developmental disabilities.29 Part I of this Note discusses the theories under-
lying CVE and CVE implementation in the United Kingdom and the United 
States.30 Part II addresses the ways in which information-sharing between 
mental health professionals and law enforcement under CVE fits within exist-
ing health care privacy laws.31 Part III argues that professional ethics codes 
should be adapted to safeguard rights and account for insufficient privacy pro-
tections under CVE.32 
I. THE THEORETICAL EVOLUTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CVE 
CVE gained traction in the United States at the start of the second decade 
of the War on Terror as a supposedly humane and uncontroversial way of ad-
dressing growing concerns about “radicalization” and homegrown terrorism.33 
Today, a wide range governments and organizations promote CVE as an effec-
tive, holistic way of addressing many forms of ideologically-motivated vio-
lence.34 CVE is also widely criticized, particularly by directly impacted com-
                                                                                                                           
 25 STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 22; Berkell, supra note 14. 
 26 STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 22. 
 27 See Hussain, supra note 1. 
 28 See id. (describing how the FBI was involved with Khan’s mental health treatment for three 
years before eventually connecting him with an undercover informant and prosecuting him on terror-
ism charges); see also Beydoun, supra note 15, at 1485 (arguing that Islamophobia is “the cornerstone 
of CVE” and that CVE threatens Muslim-Americans’ civil liberties). 
 29 See infra notes 33–199 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 33–88 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 89–160 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 161–199 and accompanying text. 
 33 See FAIZA PATEL & MEGHAN KOUSHIK, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF 
LAW, COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 5–6 (2017) (summarizing the Obama administration’s 
approach to CVE); Aziz, supra note 18, at 147, 164 (describing the ways in which community polic-
ing principles influence domestic preventive counter-terrorism strategies and how CVE is the “softer 
‘hearts and minds’ facet” of counter-terrorism); Berkell, supra note 14, at 13–17 (discussing the de-
ployment of CVE in the United States beginning with the White House’s announcement of a CVE 
domestic policy in 2011); Rascoff, supra note 17, at 153–55 (summarizing the use of “engagement” in 
Muslim communities as a component of domestic counter-terrorism policies). 
 34 See PATEL & KOUSHIK, supra note 33, at 1 (noting, in light of the election of President Donald 
Trump that CVE has always targeted Muslims); Berkell, supra note 14 (discussing international CVE 
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munities.35 Specifically, critics argue that CVE is based on unsound methodol-
ogies and biased assumptions and converts trusted social service providers into 
“soft surveillance” agents.36 Section A of Part I introduces the theoretical and 
scientific foundations for CVE.37 Section B discusses how CVE operates in the 
United Kingdom.38 Section C explains the increasingly important role of CVE 
in the United States.39 
A. Pathologizing “Radicalization” 
The term “radicalization” refers to a theorized process through which in-
dividuals adopt certain ideologies supposedly associated with terrorism.40 Aca-
demics have described “radicalization” as “what goes on before the bomb goes 
off” or “the process . . . that drives ‘unremarkable’ people to become terror-
ists.”41 Prior to 9/11, this term generally described the shift from a more mod-
erate to a stricter version of any political ideology.42 Following 9/11, however, 
                                                                                                                           
programs); The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Lisa O. Monaco (Apr. 16, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/16/remarks-assistant-president-homeland-security-and-
counterterrorism-lisa- [https://perma.cc/M5LC-F9R3] (announcing the Obama administration’s launch 
of a CVE pilot program in Boston and claiming that CVE does not target any one religious group). 
 35 See Waqas Mirza, Fighting Anti-Blackness and Islamophobia, MUSLIM INTERNATIONALIST 
(Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.tmimag.com/articles/fighting-anti-blackness-islamophobia/ [https://
perma.cc/YD97-NSGJ] (discussing the work of the Young Muslim Collective, a Minneapolis-Saint 
Paul-based Muslim-led organization advocating against CVE, which they believe “promot[es] Islam-
ophobia and anti-Blackness and stigmatiz[es] local Somali and Muslim communities”); What Is 
“Countering Violent Extremism” (CVE)?, MUSLIM JUSTICE LEAGUE, https://www.muslimjustice
league.org/cve/ [https://perma.cc/32HZ-BG57] (describing the work of a Boston-based Muslim-led 
organization that advocates against CVE, which the organization claims “has operated to falsely legit-
imize discrimination against Muslims and dissidents”). 
 36 See PATEL & KOUSHIK, supra note 33 (criticizing the premise and harms caused by CVE and 
referring to CVE as “soft surveillance”); Mirza, supra note 35; What Is “Countering Violent Extrem-
ism” (CVE)?, supra note 35. 
 37 See infra notes 40–57 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 58–76 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 77–88 and accompanying text. 
 40 Arun Kundnani, Radicalisation: The Journey of a Concept, 54 RACE & CLASS 3, 5 (2012); 
Rascoff, supra note 17, at 140. 
 41 Peter R. Neumann, Introduction, in THE INT’L CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF RADICALISATION AND 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE, PERSPECTIVES ON RADICALISATION AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE: PAPERS FROM 
THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON RADICALISATION AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 3, 4 
(2008); MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, RADICALIZATION IN THE 
WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT 2 (2007). 
 42 Kundnani, supra note 40, at 7. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by members of the 
terrorist organization al-Qaeda prompted a fundamental shift in how the United States viewed the 
threat of terrorism and marked the beginning of the War on Terror. See Aziz, supra note 18, at 177–
202 (discussing changes in the policing of Muslim communities in the aftermath of 9/11). 
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“radicalization” came to imply an ideological development associated almost 
exclusively with Islam.43 
This change in how the term “radicalization” was used resulted in a series 
of studies of the “radicalization” process.44 These studies purport to show how 
this process unfolds and involve differing levels of methodological rigor.45 One 
2007 study by the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) Intelligence Divi-
sion analyzed ten completed or thwarted terrorist attacks perpetrated by Mus-
lims in Europe and the United States.46 The study concluded that the “radicali-
zation” process includes four phases: pre-radicalization, self-identification, 
indoctrination, and jihadization.47 The study listed several indicators of an in-
dividual moving through these phases, including “giving up . . . urban hip-hop 
gangster clothes,” “growing a beard,” and “becoming involved in social activ-
ism and community issues.”48 
Early studies in the wake of 9/11, including the NYPD’s, primarily relied 
on secondary data and interviews with individuals convicted of terrorism of-
fenses, with an exclusive focus on Muslim subjects.49 Many of these studies 
                                                                                                                           
 43 Kundnani, supra note 40, at 4, 7; see Aziz Z. Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, 2 DUKE 
F. L. & SOC. CHANGE 39, 41 (2010) (describing the increase in “information about how North Ameri-
can and European states conceptualiz[e] the “radicalization” process” after 9/11); see also Akbar, 
supra note 17, at 824 (explaining how, after 9/11, terms like “radicalization” were integral to the de-
velopment of expansive law enforcement activities targeting Muslims). 
 44 See, e.g., DAVEED GARTENSTEIN-ROSS & LAURA GROSSMAN, FDD’S CTR. FOR TERRORISM 
RESEARCH, HOMEGROWN TERRORISTS IN THE U.S. AND U.K.: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE 
RADICALIZATION PROCESS 27–30 (2009) (analyzing the trajectories of 117 “Islamic homegrown 
terrorist[s]”); KUNDNANI, supra note 17, at 19–21 (summarizing studies that have had the greatest 
influence on how “radicalization” is conceptualized today); MARK SAGEMAN, UNDERSTANDING 
TERROR NETWORKS, at vii (2004) (analyzing a database of 172 terrorists committed to “global Salafi 
jihad”); QUINTAN WIKTOROWICZ, RADICAL ISLAM RISING: MUSLIM EXTREMISM IN THE WEST 4–5 
(2005) (describing a study based on ethnographic fieldwork with the al-Muhajiroun, a designated 
terrorist organization based in the United Kingdom); Huq, supra note 43, at 43–48 (describing early 
influential state-level studies of “radicalization” in the United States). 
 45 See KUNDNANI, supra note 17, at 19–21 (describing the methodological weaknesses in “radi-
calization” studies); PATEL & KOUSHIK, supra note 33, at 9–11 (discussing the “shaky” theoretical 
basis for CVE); Huq, supra note 43, at 46 (discussing how early “radicalization” studies in the United 
States reflected an “effort to establish the aura of academic credibility via a claim to precision that 
underlying data cannot support”); Rascoff, supra note 17, at 140 (noting that “radicalization” studies 
“inevitably exhibit the shortcomings of predictive social science applied to limited data sets”). 
 46 SILBER & BHATT, supra note 41, at 15; see Huq, supra note 43, at 45–46, 57 (describing and 
critiquing the sampling methods used in the NYPD’s study). 
 47 SILBER & BHATT, supra note 41, at 15, 19. 
 48 Id. at 31. 
 49 See KUNDNANI, supra note 17, at 19–21 (discussing the methodology of the most influential 
studies of “radicalization”); Beydoun, supra note 15, at 1487–88 (noting how, by identifying signs of 
Islamic piety as indicators of “radicalization,” CVE disproportionately targets “urban-dwelling, re-
cently immigrated, and indigent Muslim American communities”); Sarma, supra note 20, at 282 (ex-
plaining weaknesses in the evidence base used to identify terrorism risk factors as “due to difficulties 
accessing samples and data, as well as pragmatic and ethical barriers to conducting research on sensi-
tive topics”). 
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problematically lacked control groups, tested for correlation instead of causa-
tion, were susceptible to hindsight bias, and were never replicated or peer-
reviewed.50 Due to the methodologies employed, these studies confirmed the 
belief underpinning initial “radicalization” models that there is something in-
herent in Islam—specifically conservative or “extremist” interpretations—that 
leads to violent behavior.51 
In recent years, “radicalization” research has tended to focus on ideologi-
cal shifts, rather than violence.52 Researchers have looked increasingly further 
back in the theorized “radicalization” process to identify risk factors for the 
development of allegedly dangerous beliefs, as opposed to dangerous acts.53 In 
contrast to early studies that focused primarily on small groups of individuals 
who had actually engaged in violence and produced results overtly equating 
Islam with violence, more recent studies have identified risk factors that are 
prevalent across Muslim and non-Muslim populations. 54 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See KUNDNANI, supra note 17, at 19 (discussing the problematic lack of control groups in most 
“radicalization” studies); ASIM QURESHI, THE ‘SCIENCE’ OF PRE-CRIME: THE SECRET ‘RADICALISA-
TION’ STUDY UNDERPINNING PREVENT 28–33 (2016) (identifying key flaws in the methodology of 
the study upon which the UK’s CVE risk assessment tool—the ERG22+—was based, including the 
potential for response bias and the lack of replication assurances of reliability and validity); Huq, 
supra note 43, at 56–60 (discussing the errors in sampling and limited transparency in “radicalization” 
studies, which hinder peer review and replication); Rascoff, supra note 17, at 140 (critiquing studies’ 
limited sample sizes). 
 51 See GARTENSTEIN-ROSS & GROSSMAN, supra note 44, at 55 (highlighting the significance of 
“legalistic” and “ideologically rigid” versions of Islam); KUNDNANI, supra note 17, at 11 (“[T]he 
underlying assumption in radicalization models is usually the same: that some form of religious ideol-
ogy is a key element in turning a person into a terrorist.”); Huq, supra note 43, at 59 (discussing how 
“radicalization” studies “treat the ‘Muslim’ a priori as a source of risk and harm”). 
 52 See KUNDNANI, supra note 17, at 26 (describing the shift in focus from “violent extremism” to 
simply “extremism” in counter-terrorism literature and noting that “[l]ike the concept of radicalisa-
tion, the notion of extremism selectively blurs the distinction between belief and violence”); PATEL & 
KOUSHIK, supra note 33, at 9–10 (discussing the problematic conflation of “extremist” beliefs and 
terrorism in the research underlying CVE). 
 53 See, e.g., Kamaldeep Bhui et al., Might Depression, Psychosocial Adversity, and Limited Social 
Assets Explain Vulnerability to and Resistance Against Violent Radicalisation?, 9 PLOS ONE 1, 9 
(2014) (identifying “radicalization” risk factors such as depression and operationalizing “radicaliza-
tion” as “sympathies for violent protest and terrorism”); Sarah Lyons-Padilla et al., Belonging No-
where: Marginalization & Radicalization Risk Among Muslim Immigrants, 1 BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y 1, 
5–6 (identifying marginalization as a risk factor, and operationalizing “extremism” as certain interpre-
tations of Islam and belief that members of one’s social circle would support a hypothetical funda-
mentalist group). 
 54 See Monica Lloyd & Christopher Dean, The Development of Structured Guidelines for As-
sessing Risk in Extremist Offenders, 2 J. THREAT ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 40, 46 (2015) (listing “radi-
calization” indicators such as “mental health” and “them and us thinking”); see also Huq, supra note 
43, at 57 (describing how “radicalization” studies treat “facts that are pervasive in the ambient popula-
tion as indicators of terrorist risk”); Sarma, supra note 20, at 282 (describing how research “has iden-
tified risk factors that are so broad that they lack discriminatory value”). 
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The proliferation of “radicalization” studies has produced the scientific and 
theoretical foundation for CVE.55 These studies enable policymakers to direct 
helping professionals to use a broad array of risk assessment and intervention 
methods in efforts to prevent people from becoming “violent extremists.”56 They 
also allow lawmakers and academics to claim that such practices are evidence-
based and do not target any particular cultural, racial, or religious group.57 
B. The UK’s “Prevent” Program 
A decade-long experiment in the United Kingdom influenced the U.S. im-
plementation of CVE.58 After 9/11, the British government instituted a counter-
terrorism strategy in 2003 called “CONTEST” in response to what was viewed 
as an “emerging terrorist threat.”59 After the 2005 London bombings, CON-
TEST was revised to address the perceived growing risk of domestic terror-
ism—terrorism planned and committed within the United Kingdom.60 A 2009 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See QURESHI, supra note 50, at 6 (explaining how the ERG22+ risk assessment tool is used to 
train public sector workers in the United Kingdom who are statutorily required to monitor their pa-
tients for signs of “vulnerability to radicalization”); Currier & Hussain, supra note 23 (stating that the 
risk factors identified by the National Counterterrorism Center are provided to local law enforcement, 
education and health professionals who are encouraged to use them to rate patients). 
 56 See QURESHI, supra note 50, at 6; Currier & Hussain, supra note 23. 
 57 See, e.g., NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., EVALUATION OF A MULTI-FACETED, 
U.S. COMMUNITY-BASED, MUSLIM-LED CVE PROGRAM 5 (2016); STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION 
PLAN, supra note 22, at 5. 
 58 Rascoff, supra note 17, at 148; ‘Countering Violent Extremism,’ a Flawed Approach to Law 
Enforcement, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://aclum.org/our-work/aclum-issues/freedom-of-
expression-and-association/countering-violent-extremism-a-flawed-approach-to-law-enforcement/ 
[https://perma.cc/EKQ4-2WDM] [hereinafter Countering Violent Extremism]. Although CVE in the 
United States and the UK’s “Prevent” are independent programs, this Note sometimes uses the term 
CVE to refer to U.S. and UK attempts to implement predictive counter-terrorism programming. See 
Countering Violent Extremism, supra. CVE has been implemented throughout the United Kingdom, 
including Great Britain, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. HM GOVERNMENT, HOME DEPART-
MENT, PURSUE PREVENT PROTECT PREPARE: THE UNITED KINGDOM’S STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, 2009, Cm. 7545, at 63 (UK) [hereinafter PURSUE PREVENT PROTECT 
PREPARE]. 
 59 See HOUSE OF COMMONS, HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, PROJECT CONTEST: THE GOVERN-
MENT’S COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY, 2008, HC 212 (UK); Nicole Magney, CONTEST, Prevent, 
and the Lessons of UK Counterterrorism Policy, GEO. SECURITY STUD. REV. (May 16, 2016), http://
georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2016/05/16/contest-prevent-and-the-lessons-of-uk-counter
terrorism-policy/ [https://perma.cc/3HDQ-ZXJJ]. 
 60 See PURSUE PREVENT PROTECT PREPARE, supra note 58 (discussing CONTEST’s purpose “to 
reduce the risk to the UK and its interests oversees from international terrorism, so that people can go 
about their lives freely and with confidence” and its four strands); Huq, supra note 43, at 52 (describ-
ing how the London bombings resulted in a shift in the UK’s counter-radicalization strategy); Ian 
Cobain, London Bombings: The Day the Anti-Terrorism Rules Changed, GUARDIAN (July 7, 2010), 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jul/07/london-bombings-anti-terrorism [https://perma.cc/
B8DQ-FCFU] (discussing how the political climate following the 2005 London bombings allowed for 
the emergence of an expansive domestic counter-terrorism policy). 
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strategy document detailed CONTEST’s four strands: “Pursue, Prevent, Protect, 
and Prepare.”61 
The Prevent strand of CONTEST is the UK’s CVE program.62 Prevent is 
intended to combat terrorism and “violent extremism.”63 It includes both the risk 
assessment function of CVE and an intervention program called “Channel.”64 
Under Channel, individuals suspected of being “vulnerable to radicalization” are 
referred to multi-agency panels—including law enforcement, education, and 
social services.65 They are then subjected to a more extensive risk assessment 
and, if deemed necessary, provided with individualized services and “diversion-
ary activities.”66 Participation in Channel is not legally compulsory for those 
who are referred.67 The program is criticized, however, for coercing participa-
tion, encouraging biased targeting of Muslims, threatening confidentiality, and 
precipitating entanglements with the criminal justice and family law systems.68 
                                                                                                                           
 61 PURSUE PREVENT PROTECT PREPARE, supra note 58, at 27; Huq, supra note 43, at 51. 
 62 Jessie Blackbourn & Clive Walker, Interdiction and Indoctrination: The Counter-Terrorism 
and Security Act 2015, 79 MODERN L. REV. 840, 857–58; Huq, supra note 43, at 54. Prevent was 
recently rebranded as Engage based on the “toxicity” of the Prevent policy, but the underlying frame-
work of the program remains unchanged. See PREVENT Has Ended, Engage Is Its Rebirth, CAGE 
(Aug. 25, 2016), https://cage.ngo/article/prevent-has-ended-engage-is-its-rebirth/ [https://perma.cc/
5E3Q-9PM8]. 
 63 HM GOVERNMENT, PREVENT STRATEGY, 2011, at 23, 57 (UK); PURSUE PREVENT PROTECT 
PREPARE, supra note 58, at 11. “Violent extremism” is defined as “the active opposition to fundamen-
tal British values.” HM GOVERNMENT, supra, at 34. 
 64 HM GOVERNMENT, supra note 63, at 61. 
 65 CHANNEL DUTY GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 7, 12; HM GOVERNMENT, supra note 63, at 97. 
 66 CHANNEL DUTY GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 17. The guidance report indicates that training 
courses are one example of “diversionary actives,” and suggests that in some cases, diversionary ac-
tivities may not be sufficient and one-on-one mentoring may be necessary. Id. Other examples of 
services provided to those referred to the Channel Program include housing, health care, employment, 
faith guidance, and sports. Alan Travis, Prevent Strategy to Be Ramped up Despite ‘Big Brother’ 
Concerns, GUARDIAN (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/nov/11/prevent-
strategy-uk-counter-radicalisation-widened-despite-criticism-concerns [https://perma.cc/KF3U-
VKRC]. 
 67 CHANNEL DUTY GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 16. 
 68 See OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 24, at 65–106 (documenting cases in which 
students and patients were discriminated against by helping professionals subject to the Prevent Duty); 
Homa Khaleeli, ‘You Worry They Could Take Your Kids’: Is the Prevent Strategy Demonising Muslim 
Schoolchildren?, GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/sep/23/
prevent-counter-terrorism-strategy-schools-demonising-muslim-children [https://perma.cc/FN56-
MRNH] (discussing parents’ concerns with the expansion of Prevent); Ben Quinn, Nursery ‘Raised 
Fears of Radicalisation Over Boy’s Cucumber Drawing’, GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.
theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/11/nursery-radicalisation-fears-boys-cucumber-drawing-cooker-
bomb [https://perma.cc/Y4BX-4T6T] (discussing the case of a four-year-old Muslim boy whose 
nursery school threatened to refer him to the Channel program based on a misinterpretation of his 
pronunciation of cucumber as “cooker bomb”). 
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In 2015, the British government enacted the Counter-Terrorism and Secu-
rity Act (the “Security Act”), which created a statutory “Prevent Duty.”69 This 
new law requires certain institutions and public employees to monitor those in 
their care for “vulnerability to radicalization” and make referrals to Channel.70 
Since Prevent’s inception, and particularly since the Security Act’s passage, 
numerous Muslims have been referred to Channel as a result of profiling.71 One 
such incident involved a fourteen-year-old Muslim high school student who, 
during his French class, mentioned that certain forms of environmental activism 
are referred to as eco-terrorism.72 As a result, a school official and child protec-
tion officer removed the student from class and questioned him about his affilia-
tion with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), justifying their actions as 
“reasonable and proportionate” in light of their obligations under the Security 
Act.73 
In addition to impacting the education sector, Prevent significantly affects 
health professionals and patients.74 Some doctors have expressed concerns over 
not feeling safe to fully explore patients’ needs for fear of initiating a discussion 
that would reveal the presence of “radicalization” risk factors and require dis-
closure of confidential patient information.75 Health care professionals have 
also expressed concerns about their inability to genuinely assure patients of 
confidentiality, their complicity in the marginalization of Muslim populations, 
and conflicts between their duties under Prevent and their professional ethical 
responsibilities.76 
                                                                                                                           
 69 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, pt. 5, c. 1–2 (Eng.); Blackbourn & Walker, supra 
note 62, at 841. 
 70 QURESHI, supra note 50, at 13; Blackbourn & Walker, supra note 62, at 859–64. 
 71 QURESHI, supra note 50, at 32–33; Vickie Coppock & Mark McGovern, ‘Dangerous Minds?’ 
Deconstructing Counterterrorism Discourse, Radicalisation and the ‘Psychological Vulnerability’ of 
Muslim Children and Young People in Britain, 28 CHILD. & SOC’Y 242, 246 (2014); Miqdaad Versi, 
The Latest Prevent Figures Show Why the Strategy Needs an Independent Review, GUARDIAN (Nov. 
10, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/10/prevent-strategy-statistics-
independent-review-home-office-muslims [https://perma.cc/4NDK-4HKE]. 
 72 Vikram Dodd, School Questioned Muslim Pupil About ISIS After Discussion on Eco-Activism, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/sep/22/school-questioned-
muslim-pupil-about-isis-after-discussion-on-eco-activism [https://perma.cc/EL6B-829A]. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See As a Doctor, I Refuse to Spy on My Patients, CAGE (Feb. 12, 2016), https://cage.ngo/
article/doctor-i-refuse-spy-my-patients-0/ [https://perma.cc/CK6S-RQE5] (expressing concern at the 
imposition of the Prevent Duty on health professionals); Clare Gerada, Prevent Is Stopping GPs Like 
Me from Doing My Job, NEW STATESMAN (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/
staggers/2016/11/prevent-stopping-gps-me-doing-my-job [https://perma.cc/26PD-8H9Q] (discussing 
the negative impacts of Prevent as experienced by a health professional). 
 75 OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 24, at 48–50; Gerada, supra note 74. 
 76 OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 24, at 49, 115; ROYAL COLL. OF PSYCHIATRISTS, 
COUNTER-TERRORISM AND PSYCHIATRY, POSITION STATEMENT PS04/16 4 (2016); Gerada, supra 
note 74. 
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C. CVE in the United States 
In the United States, the Obama administration first adopted an official 
CVE policy in 2011.77 This policy was largely modeled on the UK’s Prevent 
program.78 Recognizing some of the criticisms of Prevent, however, the admin-
istration promoted CVE in the United States as an equal opportunity program.79 
That is, it allegedly focused on a wide range of groups from jihadist-inspired 
terrorists to white supremacists and animal rights activists.80 The Obama ad-
ministration also promised to move forward with CVE while upholding civil 
rights and liberties and preserving trust between communities, government, and 
law enforcement.81 
In 2014, the Obama administration announced three CVE pilot programs 
in Los Angeles, Boston, and Minneapolis-Saint Paul.82 Through the U.S. attor-
ney’s offices in these cities, CVE funds were awarded to community organiza-
tions.83 Building on the perceived success of the pilot program, in 2016, the 
Obama administration pledged ten million dollars to the federal CVE program 
and announced the first round of organizations across the country who would 
receive these funds through individual grants distributed by the Department of 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See generally DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL 
STRATEGY FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2011) [hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY]. The idea of combatting terrorism through engag-
ing with Muslim communities is not new in the United States. See MICHAEL PRICE, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUSTICE, COMMUNITY OUTREACH OR INTELLIGENCE GATHERING? A CLOSER LOOK AT “COUN-
TERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM” PROGRAMS 1–2 (2015). Efforts pre-dating CVE were criticized as 
being a vehicle for intelligence gathering. Id. 
 78 PATEL & KOUSHIK, supra note 33, at 20; Rascoff, supra note 17, at 148; Murtaza Hussain & 
Jenna McLaughlin, FBI’s “Shared Responsibility Committees” to Identify “Radicalized” Muslims Raise 
Alarms, INTERCEPT (Apr. 9, 2016), https://theintercept.com/2016/04/09/fbis-shared-responsibility-
committees-to-identify-radicalized-muslims-raises-alarms/ [https://perma.cc/LJN7-DLLU]. 
 79 NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 77, at 7; Berkell, supra note 14, at 19. 
 80 OFFFICE OF PARTNER ENGAGEMENT, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, PREVENTING VIOLENT 
EXTREMISM IN SCHOOLS 5–6 (Jan. 2016); Berkell, supra note 14, at 19; Murtaza Hussain, Trump’s 
Rhetoric on “Radical Islam” Undermines Counterextremism Programs in U.S., INTERCEPT (Feb. 8, 
2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/02/08/trumps-rhetoric-on-radical-islam-undermines-counter-
extremism-programs-in-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/5NFY-9A34]. 
 81 NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 77, at 8. 
 82 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: The White House Summit on 
Countering Violent Extremism (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/
02/18/fact-sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism [https://perma.cc/8BEP-HQRC]. 
Civil rights groups have hypothesized that Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis-Saint Paul were cho-
sen based on both their sizeable Muslim populations and their existing law enforcement “outreach” 
programs targeting Muslim communities. See Waqas Mirza, Boston Finds Muslim Surveillance Pro-
gram “Flawed and Problematic,” but Implements It Anyway, MUCKROCK (May 13, 2016), https://
www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2016/may/13/boston-cve/ [https://perma.cc/PY3C-AA6W]. 
 83 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2016 PERFORMANCE BUDGET: OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS 
238 (2015) (requesting funding for the CVE pilot program, and explaining how the Department of 
Justice would work with U.S. Attorney offices to distribute funds to local organizations). 
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Homeland Security.84 Shortly thereafter, President Donald Trump was inaugu-
rated.85 Early news reports indicated his administration’s plans to transform 
CVE to a program solely focusing on “Islamic extremism.”86 Consequently, sev-
eral organizations announced that they would reject any federal grants for 
CVE.87 The Trump administration ultimately chose to leave the federal CVE 
grant program in place but declined to issue funding to several of the initial 
grantees.88 
II. CVE AND PATIENT CONFIDENTIALITY 
For mental health treatment to be effective, patients must be able to trust 
that the information they share with their providers will not be disclosed with-
out their consent.89 For this reason, state and federal law—as well as profes-
sional codes of conduct—rigorously protect patient privacy.90 CVE compromis-
                                                                                                                           
 84 Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, DHS Awards Grants to Counter Terrorist 
Recruitment and Radicalization in the U.S. (June 23, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/06/
23/dhs-awards-grants-counter-terrorist-recruitment-and-radicalization-us [https://perma.cc/8EBS-
ZSDB]. 
 85 Julia Edwards Ainsley et al., Exclusive: Trump to Focus Counter-Extremism Program Solely 
on Islam—Sources, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-extremists-
program-exclusiv-idUSKBN15G5VO [https://perma.cc/6F7N-4PCL]; Hussain, supra note 80. 
 86 Ainsley et al., supra note 85; Hussain, supra note 80. 
 87 Amy B. Wang, Muslim Nonprofit Groups Are Rejecting Federal Funds Because of Trump, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/02/11/it-
all-came-down-to-principle-muslim-nonprofit-groups-are-rejecting-federal-funds-because-of-
trump/?utm_term=.c0532bef31b2 [https://perma.cc/Z8GX-5F6T]. One such organization that declined 
CVE funding was Ka Joog, which serves Somali American youth. Amy Forliti, Minnesota Somali 
Group Says Rejecting Federal Grant Was Right, PBS (Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/news
hour/nation/minnesota-somali-group-says-rejecting-federal-grant-right [https://perma.cc/B4BN-
LVWW]. According to Mohamed Farah, executive director of Ka Joog, the decision was based on 
President Trump’s explicitly anti-Muslim rhetoric, the executive order halting refugee resettlement and 
banning immigrants from certain Muslim majority countries, and news reports on changes to CVE. Id. 
 88 Melania Zanona, Trump Cuts Funds to Fight Anti-Right Wing Violence, THE HILL (Aug. 14, 
2017), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/346552-trump-cut-funds-to-fight-anti-right-wing-
violence [https://perma.cc/TCX4-ZHVT]. One organization that the Trump Administration declined to 
issue CVE funding to was “Life After Hate,” a non-profit aimed at rehabilitating white supremacists 
and neo-Nazis. Debbie Southorn, We Can’t Fight Trump-Style Hate with the Surveillance State (Sept. 
19, 2017), http://inthesetimes.com/article/20531/CVE-surveillance-donald-trump-life-after-hate-
islamophobia [https://perma.cc/F2QC-UH33]; Zanona, supra. 
 89 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., HIPAA PRIVACY RULE AND SHARING IN-
FORMATION RELATED TO MENTAL HEALTH 1 (2017); Len Doyal, Human Need and the Right of Pa-
tients to Privacy, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (1997); Ellen W. Grabois, The Liability of 
Psychotherapists for Breach of Confidentiality, 12 J. L. & HEALTH 39, 50 (1997). 
 90 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2017); AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS 47–59 
(2016) [hereinafter AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS]; AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES 
OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT 7–8 (2017) [hereinafter APA ETHICAL PRINCIPLES]; 
Grabois, supra note 89, at 65–80. 
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es patients’ right to privacy in several ways.91 First, when mental health profes-
sionals refer patients deemed “vulnerable to radicalization” to interdisciplinary 
teams involving law enforcement, they may disclose information obtained in 
confidential mental health treatment settings.92 Second, the interdisciplinary 
nature of CVE interventions can erode confidentiality protections, particularly 
when law enforcement officials inject themselves into a patient’s mental health 
treatment.93 As in Khan’s case, blurring of mental health and law enforcement 
roles can result in the criminalization and incarceration of mental health pa-
tients.94 
Part II of this Note explores the legal exceptions that may permit disclo-
sures of private information related to a patient’s “vulnerability to radicaliza-
tion.”95 Section A discusses the effects of Tarasoff v. Regents of University of 
California on mental health professionals’ duty to warn when they suspect a 
patient may harm another person.96 Section B discusses permissible disclosures 
of private information under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountabil-
ity Act (“HIPAA”) and the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (the “Patriot 
Act”).97 Section C compares professional associations’ codes of ethical conduct 
to health care confidentiality laws.98 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 24, at 48–50 (summarizing how Prevent im-
pacts health professionals’ work); Gerada, supra note 74 (discussing how Prevent changes how health 
care professionals interact with their patients); Michael Ward, The Impact of “Duty to Warn” (and 
Other Legal Theories) on Countering Violent Extremism Intervention Programs 4 (Dec. 2016) (un-
published M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/
51635/16Dec_Ward_Michael.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [ https://perma.cc/K8L4-XDEH] (ex-
plaining the legal challenges posed by collaboration between mental health professionals and law 
enforcement in CVE). 
 92 See OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 24, at 50 (discussing reports of British psy-
chologists breaching confidentiality without obtaining consent); PATEL & KOUSHIK, supra note 33, at 
13 (discussing how Prevent “result[s] in a system of soft surveillance and reporting by entities tradi-
tionally bound to confidentiality”); Gerada, supra note 74 (identifying patients’ fear that they will be 
reported to authorities by health professionals due to Prevent). 
 93 See Ward, supra note 91, at 10, 43 (explaining that in some cases privacy law will apply differ-
ently to different portions of a multi-disciplinary CVE program); see also LoCicero & Boyd, supra 
note 24 (describing CVE as “turning health care professionals into government informants”). 
 94 See Hussain, supra note 1 (discussing how law enforcement involvement in Khan’s mental 
health treatment led to his prosecution). 
 95 See infra notes 99–160 and accompanying text. 
 96 See infra notes 99–126 and accompanying text. 
 97 See infra notes 127–145 and accompanying text. 
 98 See infra notes 146–160 and accompanying text. 
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A. Tarasoff and the Duty to Warn 
Exceptions within confidentiality laws result in an ambiguous legal land-
scape for mental health professionals participating in CVE.99 The duty to warn, 
commonly referred to as the Tarasoff duty, is particularly relevant to mental 
health professionals who participate in CVE.100 This duty requires a profes-
sional to breach patient confidentiality where a patient is deemed a threat to 
another person.101 
Tarasoff was a 1976 California Supreme Court case following the murder 
of Tatiana Tarasoff by Prosenjit Poddar, both students at the University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley.102 Prior to the murder, Poddar received voluntary outpatient 
mental health services through the university.103 When he told his psychologist 
of his plans to kill someone, the psychologist consulted with colleagues and 
contacted the campus police.104 The police questioned Poddar and subsequently 
released him.105 After this incident, Poddar stopped seeing his psychologist, and 
several months later he stabbed Tarasoff to death.106 Tarasoff’s family sued the 
university, arguing that Poddar’s psychologist breached a duty by failing to 
warn Tarasoff of Poddar’s threats.107 The California Supreme Court ruled in 
favor of Tarasoff and established that a therapist has a duty to “use reasonable 
                                                                                                                           
 99 See PATEL & KOUSHIK, supra note 33, at 24 (highlighting conflicting statements regarding confi-
dentiality obligations); Anne Speckhard, Alarms Raised Over Safeguarding Professional Ethics in the 
FBI Proposed “Shared Responsibility Committees” for Addressing Potentially Radicalized Individuals, 
INT’L CTR. FOR STUDY OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM (Apr. 29, 2016), http://www.icsve.org/brief-
reports/alarms-raised-over-safeguarding-professional-ethics-in-fbi-proposed-shared-responsibility-
committees-addressing-potentially-radicalized-individuals/ [https://perma.cc/KE9S-EGYL] (drawing 
attention to the lack of consensus in what mental health professionals participating in CVE are permitted 
to disclose); Ward, supra note 91, at 47–64 (addressing the lack of legal clarity regarding confidentiality 
and mental health professionals’ participation in CVE). 
 100 Justin Snair et al., Rapporteurs, in COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM THROUGH PUBLIC 
HEALTH PRACTICE: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP 70 (2017); Speckhard, supra note 99; Ward, 
supra note 91, at 47–64. 
 101 Ronan Avraham & Joachim Meyer, The Optimal Scope of Physicians’ Duty to Protect Pa-
tients’ Privacy, 100 MINN L. REV. HEADNOTES 30, 39 (2016), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/02/AvrahamMeyer_PDF1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ABG9-TM9J]; see Tarasoff 
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976) (establishing mental health professionals’ 
duty to warn); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 41(a), (b)(4) (AM. LAW. INST. 2012) (stating that 
the relationship between a mental health professional and a patient triggers a mental health profes-
sional’s duty to third parties). 
 102 Douglas Mossman, Critique of Pure Risk Assessment, or Kant Meets Tarasoff, 75 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 523, 532–33 (2006); see Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 339–40. 
 103 Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 339–40; Mossman, supra note 102, at 533. 
 104 Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 339–40; Mossman, supra note 102, at 533. 
 105 Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 339–40; Mossman, supra note 102, at 533. The three police officers who 
questioned Poddar believed that he was rational and therefore released him after securing his promise 
that he would not bother Tarasoff. Mossman, supra note 102, at 533. 
 106 Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 339; Mossman, supra note 102, at 533. 
 107 Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340. 
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care to protect the intended victim” where a patient “presents a serious danger 
of violence to another.”108 
Since 1976, nearly all states have followed California in establishing a 
mental health professional’s duty to warn in certain circumstances.109 Although 
the conditions that trigger the duty to warn differ among states, all such laws 
delicately balance patients’ privacy interests against public safety.110 
In regards to CVE, research equating “extremist” ideology with violence 
skews this delicate balancing of confidentiality and public safety inherent in 
the Tarasoff duty to warn.111 In promoting CVE as providing off-ramps to vul-
nerable individuals before they ever engage in criminal conduct, agencies min-
imize the harms of CVE.112 While Tarasoff acknowledged the potential nega-
tive consequences of mental health professionals breaching confidentiality by 
showing concern for the “damage done [to] the patient,” CVE is framed as a 
way of helping all parties involved rather than a necessary harm.113 Further-
                                                                                                                           
 108 Id. 
 109 See Avraham & Meyer, supra note 101, at 39 (noting that twenty-nine states adopted manda-
tory duty to warn laws and sixteen states and the District of Columbia adopted discretionary duty to 
warn laws); Griffin Edwards, Doing Their Duty: An Empirical Analysis of the Unintended Effect of 
Tarasoff v. Regents on Homicidal Activity, 57 J. L. & ECON. 321, 325–26 (2014) (noting that about 
half of all states have a mandatory duty to warn similar to Tarasoff and about seventeen percent have a 
discretionary duty to warn law). In some cases, the duty to warn requires mental health professionals 
to take action only when a patient articulates a specific threat to do serious harm to a reasonably iden-
tifiable victim and only when such a plan is actually feasible and imminent. See, e.g., Mossman, supra 
note 102, at 588 (describing Ohio’s narrow interpretation of the Tarasoff duty). In some states this 
duty is interpreted more broadly to require warnings even when a victim is not identifiable and the 
harm is not believed to be imminent. See, e.g., Avraham & Meyer, supra note 101, at 39–40 (identify-
ing broad interpretations in Nebraska and Michigan). 
 110 See, e.g., Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1339 (D. Colo. 1983), aff’d, 751 F.2d 329 
(10th Cir. 1984) (finding that “[h]uman behavior is simply too unpredictable, and the field of psycho-
therapy presently too inexact” to impose what would amount to a strict liability duty on psychothera-
pists for the sake of protecting public safety); Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159, 170 (Wis. 
1988) (“The concern regarding the preservation of patient trust in the confidentiality of communica-
tions is legitimate, yet one which must yield in those limited circumstances where the public interest 
in safety from violent assault is threatened”). 
 111 See OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 24, at 48 (discussing the Channel program’s 
blurring of terrorism and non-violent extremism); PATEL & KOUSHIK, supra note 33, at 9–10 (discuss-
ing the problematic conflation of “extremist” beliefs and terrorism in the research underlying CVE); 
Speckhard, supra note 99 (noting that mental health professionals “may now believe they have blan-
ket national security ‘loopholes’ to report on their clients to the FBI” under CVE). 
 112 See STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 22 (describing CVE as providing “alter-
native pathways or ‘off-ramps’ for individuals who appear to be moving toward violent action but 
who have not yet engaged in criminal activity”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 
Announcing the CVE Grants Program (July 6, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/blog/2016/07/06/
announcing-cve-grants-program [https://perma.cc/HQE6-479D] [hereinafter CVE Grants Press Re-
lease] (promoting CVE as providing off-ramps). 
 113 See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 346 (acknowledging the harms of disclosing a mental health pa-
tient’s private information); Berkell, supra note 14, at 52 (arguing that “[t]he criminal justice system, 
and cases involving material support for terrorism in particular, provide opportunities to counter vio-
lent extremism with full respect for civil rights and civil liberties”). 
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more, helping professionals are exposed to public narratives regarding “radi-
calization” and the threat of homegrown terrorism.114 Consequently, mental 
health professionals may be overcautious and swayed towards referring their 
patients to CVE intervention programs at the expense of confidentiality.115 
The increased use of actuarial risk assessment tools to predict likelihood 
of violence may also implicate the ways in which mental health professionals 
engage with CVE.116 The assumption underlying the Tarasoff decision is 
that—in at least some situations—mental health professionals are able to pre-
dict future violence with reasonable certainty.117 In Tarasoff, the California 
Supreme Court suggested that mental health professionals’ can effectively de-
termine whether a patient is likely to harm another person based on their indi-
vidual experience and education.118 Increasingly, however, mental health pro-
fessionals use actuarial methods, such as checklists and scoring guides, to con-
duct assessments of their patients’ likelihood of engaging in acts of violence.119 
These actuarial methods of risk assessment are considered beneficial in some 
settings because they decrease the likelihood of bias and other types of error in 
risk determinations.120 Additionally, in some contexts, actuarial methods are 
                                                                                                                           
 114 See Mary Brigid Martin, Perceived Discrimination of Muslims in Health Care, 9 J. MUSLIM 
MENTAL HEALTH 2, 58 (2015) (showing that “anti-Muslim discrimination crosses over from society 
to the health care setting in the United States”). 
 115 See OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 24, at 43 (quoting a British mental health 
professional explaining that many of her colleagues comply with Prevent because “the cost of not 
[referring] would be borne by them whereas the cost of a referral is borne by the referred individual”); 
Snair et al., supra note 100 (discussing how Tarasoff may be used to “breach personal liberties” in 
CVE contexts). But see Ward, supra note 91, at 62 (cautioning that mental health professionals partic-
ipating in CVE may be too hesitant to “discharg[e] their protective duty” considering the ethical and 
legal obligations imposed on them). 
 116 See Mossman, supra note 102, at 528–29 (discussing scientific advances in the field of risk 
assessment since Tarasoff was decided in 1976); Douglas Mossman, The Imperfection of Protection 
Through Detection and Intervention, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 109, 127–28 (2009) (discussing how actuarial 
methods of risk assessment have advantages over clinical determinations); Sarma, supra note 20, at 
280 (describing actuarial methods of risk assessment as beneficial given “the objectivity of the deci-
sion-making process and the high interrater reliability across evaluators”). 
 117 See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345 (recognizing that, although a therapist cannot predict future 
violence with absolute certainty in all situations, the defendant in Tarasoff accurately predicted that 
the patient would cause harm, but failed to give sufficient warnings); Mossman, supra note 102, at 
543–44 (noting that the Tarasoff decision suggests that it is possible to distinguish between “those 
clinical situations in which patients pose ‘a serious danger of violence’ that constitutes a ‘public peril,’ 
and those situations in which patients pose no such danger”). 
 118 Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345; Mossman, supra note 116, at 112–13. 
 119 Mossman, supra note 116, at 127–28; see Betsy J. Grey, Implications of Neuroscience Ad-
vances in Tort Law: A General Overview, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 671, 691–92 (2015) (discussing 
the ways in which advances in neuroscience methods of risk assessment may also impact the applica-
tion of the Tarasoff duty). 
 120 See, e.g., PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT: SCIENCE PROVIDES GUID-
ANCE ON ASSESSING DEFENDANTS 1 (2015) (explaining the advantages of actuarial risk assessment 
methods over money bond schedules and intuition in deciding which defendants to detain pretrial); 
Melissa Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect Science: Future Dangerousness 
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more accurate at predicting violence and less likely to yield false predictions 
than human judgment.121 
In the context of CVE, however, risk assessment tools are inherently bi-
ased due to small and selective sample populations and other methodological 
flaws in studies underlying CVE.122 Additionally, actuarial methods of deter-
mining “vulnerability to radicalization” measure a subject’s risk of developing 
certain “extreme” ideologies, rather than risk of violence.123 For example, 
Channel’s definition of “extremism” as “the active opposition to fundamental 
British values” suggests that risk factors predicting whether someone will fit 
this definition of an “extremist” do not predict whether that person will engage 
in violent activity.124 Considering the misperception that risk factors identified 
in CVE literature are signs of future violence, mental health professionals us-
ing risk assessment tools in their work may believe that such factors trigger the 
Tarasoff duty and thereby permit disclosure of confidential information.125 Be-
cause CVE does not provide reliable guidance on predicting future violence, 
however, such disclosures risk harming patients without protecting any over-
arching public safety interest.126 
                                                                                                                           
Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 697, 698, 712 (2011) (noting the important 
role that actuarial risk assessment tools play in the context of sex offenses); Eric S. Janus & Robert A. 
Prentky, Forensic Risk of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility, and 
Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1457–58 (2003) (discussing the ways in which bias im-
pacts clinical dangerousness assessments, as opposed to actuarial methods). 
 121 Mossman, supra note 116, at 128; J.C. Oleson et al., Training to See Risk: Measuring the 
Accuracy of Clinical and Actuarial Risk Assessments Among Federal Probation Officers, 75 FED. 
PROB. 52, 52 (2011). 
 122 See QURESHI, supra note 50, at 15 (discussing the problems with the ERG 22+ risk assessment 
tool); Huq, supra note 43, at 57 (critiquing the purposive sampling methods and other methodological 
flaws in Radicalization in the West); Sarma, supra note 20, at 284 (stating that “actuarial approaches 
to risk assessment are not appropriate or ethical in the terrorism prevention context”). A risk assess-
ment tool based on studies involving an insufficiently representative sample population—for example, 
studies focusing solely on one religious group—is likely to produce high levels of false positives. See 
QURESHI, supra note 50, at 32–33; Alice Ross, Academics Criticize Anti-Radicalisation Strategy in 
Open Letter, GUARDIAN (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/sep/29/
academics-criticise-prevent-anti-radicalisation-strategy-open-letter [https://perma.cc/T5G8-CVCC]. 
 123 PATEL & KOUSHIK, supra note 33, at 9–10; see QURESHI, supra note 50, at 28 (discussing 
methodological flaws with the ERG 22+ study, including that its sample was comprised of individuals 
convicted of both violent and nonviolent crimes). 
 124 See HM GOVERNMENT, supra note 63, at 34. 
 125 See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345 (acknowledging the difficult balancing of policy values the 
Tarasoff duty requires of mental health professionals); Ward, supra note 91, at 43 (stating that “CVE 
practitioners involved in intervention programs will be on the razor’s edge of this balance” between 
confidentiality and public safety). 
 126 See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 347 (justifying breaches in confidentiality based on the conclusion 
that “[t]he protective privilege ends where the public peril begins”); KUNDNANI, supra note 17, at 19–
21 (discussing flaws in the foundational studies underlying “radicalization” theories and CVE, which 
assumes that ideology is linked to violence); QURESHI, supra note 50, at 32–33 (noting the inefficacy 
of British CVE risk assessment methods, given the high percentage of individuals referred to Channel 
but determined not to require interventions); I Refused to Work with PREVENT and Now I’m Afraid of 
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B. Medical Records Privacy 
Mental health professionals’ obligations regarding patient privacy are also 
governed by HIPAA.127 HIPAA was aimed at increasing the efficiency of health 
care and health insurance systems.128 The 2003 HIPAA Privacy Rule governs 
the privacy of medical records and applies to any entity that electronically 
transmits health information in connection with certain health care transac-
tions.129 HIPAA designates all information that relates to a patient’s treatment 
and has the potential to reveal the patient’s identity as protected health infor-
mation (“PHI”).130 HIPAA prohibits covered entities from disclosing PHI with-
out a patient’s informed consent unless an exception applies.131 
Exceptions to the HIPAA Privacy Rule most relevant to CVE include situ-
ations in which disclosure is deemed necessary to protect public safety or en-
sure national security.132 Similar to the Tarasoff duty, HIPAA’s Privacy Rule 
permits health professionals to breach confidentiality when a patient presents a 
danger to others.133 The HIPAA Privacy Rule also contains an exception permit-
ting disclosure of private information to federal officials for national security 
purposes.134 
                                                                                                                           
Losing My Children, CAGE (Jan. 6, 2017), https://cage.ngo/article/i-refused-to-work-with-prevent-
and-now-im-afraid-of-losing-my-children/ [https://perma.cc/AYF7-XK7M] (discussing one family’s 
struggles as a result of interactions with Prevent). 
 127 See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF THE 
HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 2–3 (2003) [hereinafter HIPAA PRIVACY RULE SUMMARY]. 
 128 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2017); Beverly Cohen, Reconciling the HIPAA Privacy Rule with State 
Laws Regulating Ex Parte Interviews of Plaintiffs’ Treating Physicians: A Guide to Performing 
HIPAA Preemption Analysis, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (2006). 
 129 See § 160.103 (defining “covered entity” for the purposes of the applicability of HIPAA and 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule); HIPAA PRIVACY RULE SUMMARY, supra note 127, at 2–3 (summarizing 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s definition of covered entities); Cohen, supra note 128 (noting that 
HIPAA’s covered entity definition includes “most healthcare providers”). The HIPPA Privacy Rule 
also applies to portions of “hybrid entities” that engage in activities that are and are not covered by 
HIPAA. See §§ 164.103, .105. 
 130 § 160.103; HIPAA PRIVACY RULE SUMMARY, supra note 127, at 3–4; Cohen, supra note 128, 
at 1095–96. 
 131 See § 164.502(a) (outlining HIPAA’s general rules relating to disclosures of protected health 
information (“PHI”)); § 164.512 (listing situations in which a covered entity may disclose PHI with-
out affording the patient an opportunity to agree or object); HIPAA PRIVACY RULE SUMMARY, supra 
note 127, at 4–9 (summarizing exceptions to the HIPAA Privacy Rule). 
 132 Snair et al., supra note 100; see § 164.512(j)(1) (public health/safety exception); § 164.512(k)(2) 
(national security exception). 
 133 § 164.512(j); Mark A. Rothstein, Tarasoff Duties After Newtown, 42 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 104, 
107 (2014); see Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340. HIPAA also explicitly requires that disclosures comply with 
“applicable law and standards of ethical conduct.” § 164.512(j). Where state law is “contrary to” 
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule, however, HIPAA preempts it. Cohen, supra note 128, at 1105. 
 134 § 164.512(k)(2); Ward, supra note 91, at 39. While the “threat to health or public safety” ex-
ception to the HIPAA Privacy Rule provides heightened protections to individuals receiving mental 
health services, particularly in relation to involvement with the criminal justice system, the national 
security exception contains no such protections. See § 164.512(j)(2)–(k)(2). 
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Mental health professionals participating in CVE may see instances where 
patients show “vulnerability to radicalization” as permitting disclosures of pri-
vate information under exceptions to the HIPAA Privacy Rule.135 In cases like 
Khan’s in which the FBI is already monitoring a patient receiving treatment—
and there is a clear link between the patient and national security activities—it 
is even more likely that disclosures will be seen as falling under HIPAA’s public 
safety or national security exceptions.136 
The Patriot Act may also govern cases like Khan’s that involve mental 
health providers and law enforcement.137 The Patriot Act authorizes disclosure 
of any tangible thing, including health records, without a patient’s consent or 
knowledge for counter-terrorism purposes.138 The Patriot Act prohibits disclo-
sure if an investigation is too closely tied to activities protected under the First 
Amendment, such as political speech or religious practices, but the actual 
strength of this protection is unclear.139 The broad provisions within the Patriot 
Act permitting disclosure of records related to counter-terrorism investigations 
therefore suggest that mental health providers may be required to produce rec-
ords relating to CVE.140 In such cases, moreover, the patient would not know 
that their confidentiality was compromised.141 
HIPAA and the Patriot Act purport to strike a balance between maintaining 
confidentiality in health care settings, upholding civil rights, and protecting 
public safety and national security.142 CVE distorts this balance in two ways.143 
First, because CVE is presented as providing an off-ramp that will help subjects 
avoid, rather than expose them to, involvement with the criminal justice system, 
health professionals pressured to disclose information may see the potential 
                                                                                                                           
 135 Snair et al., supra note 100. 
 136 See id. (discussing HIPAA’s confidentiality exceptions in the contexts of ethical challenges 
facing health professionals participating in CVE); Hussain, supra note 1 (describing the FBI’s in-
volvement in Khan’s mental health treatment and prosecution). 
 137 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Obstruct 
Terrorism Act of 2001 (the “Patriot Act”), Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287–88 (2001) 
(codified as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 1861) (permitting disclosure of private business records if or-
dered as part of an investigation related to foreign or domestic terrorism). 
 138 Id.; FAQ on Government Access to Medical Records, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://
www.aclu.org/other/faq-government-access-medical-records [https://perma.cc/8JY9-L68F]. 
 139 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012); Kyle Welch, The PATRIOT Act and Cri-
sis Legislation: The Unintended Consequences of Disaster Lawmaking, 43 CAP. U. L. REV. 481, 532–
33 (2015). 
 140 50 U.S.C. § 1861; NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., supra note 16, at ii (describing CVE as 
“help[ing] prevent terrorism and disengag[ing] those already involved in terrorism”). 
 141 50 U.S.C. § 1861. 
 142 See id. (highlighting constitutional limits on the circumstances in which information must be 
turned over to law enforcement, even if related to an investigation); 8 C.F.R. §§ 164.502, .512 (per-
mitting disclosure of PHI in limited circumstances). 
 143 See STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 22, at 3 (explaining that defending civil 
rights is in itself a means of CVE); Berkell, supra note 14, at 52 (arguing that CVE aims can be ac-
complished without infringing on individual rights). 
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harms of such disclosures as minimal.144 Second, because the research under-
pinning CVE ties First Amendment protected activities—such as religious prac-
tices and political expression—to risk for “radicalization,” the Patriot Act’s 
safeguarding of these activities may have little meaning in CVE contexts.145 
C. Professional Associations’ Codes of Ethical Conduct 
In addition to state and federal laws, professional codes of ethics play an 
important role in protecting patient privacy and holding mental health profes-
sionals accountable.146 The role of codes of ethics in the War on Terror has re-
ceived considerable attention since it was discovered that the American Psy-
chological Association (“APA”) structured its Code of Ethics to allow psy-
chologists to participate in torturing terrorism suspects detained at Guantána-
mo, Abu Ghraib, and other facilities.147 In response to this controversy, the 
APA’s Council of Representatives joined other professional associations in vot-
ing to adopt anti-torture provisions within its code of ethics.148 This controver-
                                                                                                                           
 144 See CVE Grants Press Release, supra note 112 (describing CVE as providing off-ramps); 
Stevan M. Weine et al., Addressing Violent Extremism as Public Health Policy and Practice, BEHAV. 
SCI. TERRORISM & POL. AGGRESSION 10 (June 28, 2016), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/
10.1080/19434472.2016.1198413?scroll=top&needAccess=true [https://perma.cc/CA2H-LCEA] 
(proposing that by framing CVE as a public health program, it will be possible to address multiple 
“youth well-being concerns”). 
 145 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (prohibiting disclosures of confidential infor-
mation under the Patriot Act if an investigation is too closely tied to First Amendment-protected activ-
ities); PATEL & KOUSHIK, supra note 33, at 15 (summarizing supposed “terrorism indicators” identi-
fied in various studies such as “[f]requent attendance at mosque or prayer group”); Beydoun, supra 
note 15, at 1467 (describing how “CVE policing of indigent Muslim American communities . . . en-
dangers . . . their constitutionally protected First Amendment activities”). 
 146 APA ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 90, at 3; Jonathan H. Marks, Doctors as Pawns? Law 
and Medical Ethics at Guantánamo Bay, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 711, 713 (2007). 
 147 DAVID HOFFMAN, REPORT TO THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF 
THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION: INDEPENDENT REVIEW RELATING TO APA ETHICS 
GUIDELINES, NATIONAL SECURITY INTERROGATIONS, AND TORTURE 70 (2015); see Katherine Eban, 
The Psychologists Who Taught the C.I.A. How to Torture (and Charged $180 Million), VANITY FAIR 
(Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/daily-news/2014/12/psychologists-cia-torture-report 
[https://perma.cc/A7VZ-QXHP]; James Risen, Outside Psychologists Shielded U.S. Torture Program, 
Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/11/us/psychologists-
shielded-us-torture-program-report-finds.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/CS2M-RZSX]. During the Bush 
administration, civil rights advocates discovered that mental health professionals were involved in the 
War on Terror as behavioral science consultants, and in this role, they “advised interrogators how to 
ramp up interrogation stressors.” Marks, supra note 146, at 714–15. The Hoffman Report, released in 
2015, revealed that such actions were due in part to the fact that American Psychological Association 
(“APA”) officials “colluded with important [Department of Defense (“DoD”)] officials to have APA 
issue loose, high-level ethical guidelines that did not constrain DoD in any greater fashion than exist-
ing DoD interrogation guidelines.” HOFFMAN, supra, at 9. 
 148 See No More Torture: World’s Largest Group of Psychologists Bans Role in National Security 
Interrogations, DEMOCRACY NOW (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.democracynow.org/2015/8/10/
no_more_torture_world_s_largest [https://perma.cc/GA7K-JECG] (discussing the APA’s new anti-
torture measures); Revision of Ethics Code Standard 3.04, APA (Jan. 1, 2017), http://www.apa.org/
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sy demonstrated how codes of ethics can shape mental health professionals’ 
collusion with—or resistance against—abusive counter-terrorism practices.149 
Professional associations have gradually developed extensive lists of ethi-
cal standards, which their members are required to learn and follow.150 Profes-
sional associations enforce these codes through licensing and professional 
sanctions.151 Despite their limited enforceability, however, codes of ethics play 
a crucial role in establishing clear standards and providing a basis for re-
sistance when mental health professionals are pressured to act in an unethical 
manner.152 
Professional codes of conduct generally recognize patients’ autonomy and 
privacy rights.153 The codes’ exceptions to confidentiality duties, however, do 
not significantly differ from applicable laws.154 The APA Code of Ethics, for 
                                                                                                                           
ethics/code/standard-304.aspx [https://perma.cc/LFU2-D6AB] (reporting on new amendments to the 
APA ethics code prohibiting psychologists’ involvement in torture); see also Steven H. Miles, Medi-
cal Associations and Accountability for Physician Participation in Torture, 17 AMA J. ETHICS 945, 
947 (2015) (advocating that national medical associations follow the lead of the World Medical Asso-
ciation in setting standards against physicians’ participation in torture). See generally WORLD MEDI-
CAL ASS’N, WMA DECLARATION OF TOKYO: GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICIANS CONCERNING TORTURE 
AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT IN RELATION TO DE-
TENTION AND IMPRISONMENT (2016) (prohibiting physicians’ participation in torture). 
 149 See Marks, supra note 146 (explaining the important role of ethics codes where laws are un-
clear); Eric Merriam, Legal but Unethical: Interrogation and Military Health Professionals, 11 IND. 
HEALTH L. REV. 123, 212 (2014) (explaining that, when legal and ethical guidelines conflict, profes-
sional associations have a great deal of power in controlling policy). 
 150 Merriam, supra note 149, at 139–43. 
 151 APA ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 90, at 2 (noting in introduction to the code of ethics 
that the APA Ethics Code is intended as a guide, and does not predicate civil liability); Merriam, su-
pra note 149, at 142 (discussing the limited ways in which state licensing boards enforce ethical 
codes). 
 152 See Marks, supra note 146, at 723 (“In the face of the Administration’s efforts to circumvent 
international legal protections . . . the voice of professional ethics is especially important.”). See gen-
erally Nancy Sherman, From Nuremburg to Guantánamo: Medical Ethics Then and Now, 6 WASH. U. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 609 (2007) (comparing the Nuremburg Trials and the revelations regarding 
health professionals’ participation in torture in the War on Terror, and describing how both events 
resulted in heightened interest in the role of medical ethics in contexts of immoral and ambiguous 
laws). 
 153 See, e.g., AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 90, at 1–2 (Principles IV, IX) (listing 
equal access to healthcare and “safeguard[ing] patient confidences and privacy” as foundational ethi-
cal values); APA ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 90, at 3–4 (including “privacy, confidentiality, and 
self-determination” in a list of general principles guiding psychologists “toward the very highest ethi-
cal ideals of the profession”); NAT’L ASS’N OF SOCIAL WORKERS, CODE OF ETHICS 5–6 (2017) [here-
inafter NASW CODE OF ETHICS] (including self-determination within the broad foundational principle 
of “dignity and worth of the person”). 
 154 See, e.g., AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 90, at 53–54 (Standard 3.2.1) (permit-
ting disclosure of information without a patient’s consent when required by law or when a patient 
endangers another person); APA ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 90, at 8 (Standard 4.05) (permitting 
disclosure of information without a patient’s consent when required or permitted by law, specifically 
to protect against harm); NASW CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 153, at 11–14 (Standard 1.07) (permit-
ting limited disclosures when a patient endangers another person); see also Rothstein, supra note 133, 
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example, states that unauthorized disclosures of confidential information are 
acceptable where required by law or where permitted by law to “protect . . . 
others from harm.”155 The American Medical Association, National Associa-
tion of Social Workers, and American Psychiatric Association use similar lan-
guage to articulate the circumstances in which disclosures of confidential in-
formation are permissible.156 While these ethical standards are in some cases 
narrower than the Tarasoff duty, they generally permit disclosures of confiden-
tial information where a patient shows signs of dangerousness.157 
Some health care professionals have questioned whether participation in 
CVE compromises their professional ethics.158 The exceptions to confidentiali-
ty obligations within medical ethics codes that generally mirror the Tarasoff 
duty and the HIPAA Privacy Rule, however, cause the same type of distortion 
as these laws with regards to “vulnerability to radicalization” (i.e., vulnerabil-
ity to developing allegedly dangerous ideas) and the risk of actually engaging 
in violence.159 Because CVE conflates ideology and violence and is promoted 
as a way of helping patients access services and avoid criminal involvement, 
mental health professionals may see confidentiality exceptions within applica-
ble professional codes of conduct as permitting disclosures and referrals to 
CVE intervention programs.160 
                                                                                                                           
at 106–07 (comparing requirements triggering a mental health professional’s duty to warn or authority 
to breach confidentiality under Tarasoff, HIPAA, and various medical codes of ethical conduct). 
 155 APA ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 90, at 8; see Rothstein, supra note 133, at 106 (noting 
that while the disclosures provision within the APA’s Ethics Code permits but does not require mental 
health professionals to warn third parties). 
 156 See AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 90, at 54 (Standard 3.2.1(e)(ii)) (permitting 
disclosure when a physician believes that “the patient will inflict serious physical harm on an identifi-
able individual or individuals”); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS 7 
(Standard 4.8) (2013) (permitting disclosure “[w]hen, in the clinical judgment of the treating psychia-
trist, the risk of danger is deemed to be significant”); NASW CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 153, at 11–
12 (Standard 1.07) (permitting disclosure only if “necessary to prevent serious, foreseeable, and im-
minent harm to a client or other identifiable person”). 
 157 See AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 90, at 54 (Standard 3.2.1(e)(ii)); APA ETHI-
CAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 90, at 8; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 156; NASW CODE OF 
ETHICS, supra note 153, at 11–12; Rothstein, supra note 133, at 106–07 (comparing requirements 
triggering a mental health professional’s duty to warn under Tarasoff, HIPAA, and various medical 
codes of ethical conduct). 
 158 See OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 24, at 50 (quoting a British psychologist as 
stating that the obligations of health professionals under the Prevent program are “ethically hugely 
problematic”); LoCicero & Boyd, supra note 24 (comparing CVE with mental health professionals’ 
ethical obligation to warn); Speckhard, supra note 99 (cautioning that “professionals agreeing to take 
part in [CVE] must consider carefully existing security, legal and ethical protections”). 
 159 See PATEL & KOUSHIK, supra note 33, at 9–10 (discussing the dangers of CVE’s conflation of 
ideology and violence); Snair et al., supra note 100, at 69–72 (discussing the range of ethical issues 
facing health professionals participating in CVE); Rothstein, supra note 133, at 106–07 (comparing 
confidentiality exceptions in Tarasoff, HIPAA, and ethics codes). 
 160 See STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 22 (describing CVE as providing “alter-
native pathways or ‘off-ramps’”); Weine et al., supra note 144, at 1, 10 (arguing that CVE can be a 
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III. RESPONDING TO INSUFFICIENT LEGAL PROTECTIONS BY REVISING 
PROFESSIONAL CODES OF CONDUCT 
CVE operates in a context lacking sufficient legal or ethical protections to 
safeguard patient privacy.161 Disclosures of confidential information threaten 
the fundamental right to privacy and the trust necessary for effective mental 
health treatment without improving public safety.162 Because CVE encourages 
disclosures that may fit within existing exceptions to confidentiality laws and 
ethical obligations, alternative protections should be put in place to mitigate 
the harm that CVE inflicts.163 Section A of Part III discusses how professional 
associations’ responses to CVE can in some ways make up for the lack of legal 
protections.164 Section B suggests specific areas where codes of ethics should 
be revised to respond to the danger of disclosure of private information under 
CVE.165 
A. The Importance of Revising Professional Codes of Conduct in the 
Context of the War on Terror 
Certain guiding principles shape professional codes of conduct, including 
respect for privacy.166 Like HIPAA and other statutory and common law confi-
dentiality protections, however, codes of conduct include exceptions to the 
general obligation of mental health professionals to maintain patient confiden-
                                                                                                                           
non-coercive public health program); see also Countering Violent Extremism: The Trump Era – Panel 
I, CATO INST. (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.cato.org/multimedia/events/countering-violent-extremism-
trump-era-panel-i [https://perma.cc/QYW5-LA4H] (speaking of the dangers of CVE and calling on 
fellow psychologists “to begin to step back . . . and ask . . . what are the ways that we’re doing good 
and what are the ways that we’re doing potential harm”). 
 161 See Snair et al., supra note 100, at 69–72 (describing the legal and ethical ambiguities for 
health professionals participating in CVE); LoCicero & Boyd, supra note 24 (voicing mental health 
professionals’ legal and ethical concerns about participating in CVE). 
 162 See OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 24 (discussing how the Prevent program in 
the United Kingdom threatens trust between helping professionals and those they serve); PATEL & 
KOUSHIK, supra note 33, at 13–20 (arguing that CVE is not based on empirical research and will not 
improve public safety); Aziz, supra note 14, at 269–72 (arguing that “CVE programs are unnecessary 
to prevent domestic terrorism”); see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (establishing the right to liberty 
from state intrusion into one’s private life without due process); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
578 (2003) (recognizing a right to privacy where a law “furthers no legitimate state interest which can 
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (recognizing “a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights”); G.A. Res. 217 
(III) A, Art. 12, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) (recognizing the right not to 
be “subjected to arbitrary interference with . . . privacy”). 
 163 See infra notes 166–199 and accompanying text. 
 164 See infra notes 166–180 and accompanying text. 
 165 See infra notes 181–199 and accompanying text. 
 166 See, e.g., AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 90, at 1–2; APA ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, 
supra note 90, at 3–4. 
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tiality.167 Because these exceptions have the potential to obscure mental health 
professionals’ obligations in the context of CVE, mental health providers 
should revise the ethical rules governing their professions.168 
Mental health professionals should also take steps to address the dangers 
of CVE because of their commitment to cultural competence.169 Mental health 
professionals often tailor their practice to account for the ways in which vari-
ous forms of oppression, including biased targeting and surveillance, cause 
unique harm to targeted populations.170 The ways in which CVE co-opts men-
tal health services to monitor communities viewed as inherently suspect is an 
affront to the basic tenets of professional ethics, threatening privacy and exac-
erbating health disparities.171 Professional codes of ethics should therefore also 
be revised to ensure that mental health professionals are held to clear standards 
for providing culturally competent care in the context of the War on Terror.172 
In many ways, professional codes of conduct reflect domestic and inter-
national legal norms.173 As the controversy surrounding health professionals’ 
complicity in the torture of detainees in the War on Terror has shown, however, 
codes of ethics can hold mental health professionals to higher standards where 
                                                                                                                           
 167 See, e.g., AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 90, at 54 (Standard 3.2.1(e)(ii)); AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 156; NASW CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 153, at 11–12 (Standard 
1.07(c)); see also Sherman, supra note 152, at 617 (describing how the involvement of psychologists 
in interrogations as part of the War on Terror was a result in part of the APA’s permissive code of 
ethics and the lack of clarity as to whether psychologists are bound by the Hippocratic oath to do no 
harm). 
 168 See Marks, supra note 146 (advocating for ethical reforms where laws governing health profes-
sionals are ambiguous); Gerada, supra note 74 (requesting guidance from the UK’s General Medical 
Council regarding physicians’ ethical duties under Prevent); Carrie York Al-Karam, APA—Urgently 
Evaluate and Take Official Position on CVE Programs, CHANGE.ORG, https://www.change.org/p/susan-
mcdaniel-apa-president-apa-urgently-evaluate-and-take-official-position-on-cve-programs?recruiter=
486360906&utm_source=petitions_show_components_action_panel_wrapper&utm_medium=copy
link&recuruit_context=copylink_long [https://perma.cc/JEX4-8ZTB] (calling on the APA to take an 
official position on CVE). 
 169 See generally AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, APA GUIDELINES ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION, 
TRAINING, RESEARCH, PRACTICE AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS (2002) (pre-
senting six guidelines on cultural competence in psychology). 
 170 See Alexander J. O’Connor & Farhana Jahan, Under Surveillance and Overwrought: Ameri-
can Muslims’ Emotional and Behavioral Responses to Government Surveillance, 8 J. MUSLIM MEN-
TAL HEALTH 95, 101–02 (2014) (reporting results from an original study showing that Muslims sub-
jected to surveillance in the United States reported increased levels of anxiety). 
 171 See O’Connor & Jahan, supra note 170. 
 172 See AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, supra note 169; O’Connor & Jahan, supra note 170. 
 173 See Marks, supra note 146, at 724 (describing how codes of medical ethics are sometimes 
grounded in international law, and sometimes impose broader obligations on professionals than appli-
cable laws); Rothstein, supra note 133, at 106–07 (discussing how national professional codes of 
conduct include similar provisions as Tarasoff and HIPAA concerning confidentiality). But see Merri-
am, supra note 149, at 203 (discussing conflicts between health professionals’ legal and ethical obli-
gations concerning interrogation). 
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the law is used to justify abuse.174 Provisions within professional codes of con-
duct demonstrate that there is a historical precedent for adopting standards 
governing situations in which mental health professionals may be permitted or 
even required under the law to violate fundamental rights.175 The APA, for ex-
ample, amended its code of conduct in 2010 to state that—where legal and eth-
ical duties conflict—psychologists are never permitted to engage in human 
rights abuses.176 Professional associations should continue to hold their mem-
bers to higher standards than existing laws and amend their codes of conduct to 
specifically account for the dangers of CVE.177 
As a first step, professional associations should discourage their members 
from participating in CVE in any capacity.178 Professional associations should 
also use their advocacy and organizing powers to encourage communities, or-
ganizations, and states to resist CVE.179 As organizations respected for their 
                                                                                                                           
 174 See Marks, supra note 146, at 713, 717–18 (discussing how, in light of psychologists’ lawful 
involvement in torture, a reaffirmation of strong codes of ethics is necessary for mental health profes-
sionals to “maintain the social and cultural status engendered by their perceived humanitarian ethos”); 
Merriam, supra note 149, at 212–14 (discussing the heightened power of professional associations 
where laws governing health professionals are ambiguous); Miles, supra note 148 (advocating that 
national medical associations “endorse strong standards” against complicity in torture). 
 175 See Amending the Ethics Code (2010), APA, http://www.apa.org/monitor/2010/04/ethics.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/TJ3G-FM2P] (discussing the 2002 and 2010 amendments to the APA Ethics Code 
responding to concerns about situations in which legal and ethical duties of psychologists conflict); 
Marks, supra note 146, at 724 (explaining that “[s]ome codes of professional ethics impose firm con-
straints on health professionals, irrespective of applicable legal norms”). 
 176 See Amending the Ethics Code (2010), supra note 175. The APA amended its code of conduct 
in 2002 to articulate a process through which psychologists may attempt to reconcile conflicts be-
tween legal and ethical duties and permitting psychologists to engage in civil disobedience when they 
are required by law to act in an unethical manner. Id. In 2010, however, the APA incorporated 
amendments into its Ethics Code stating in unambiguous terms that legal and ethical conflicts may not 
justify psychologists’ participation in human rights abuses. Id. 
 177 See Marks, supra note 146 (advocating for ethical reforms where laws governing health pro-
fessionals are ambiguous); Gerada, supra note 74 (advocating for clarification of medical profession-
als’ ethical duties under Prevent); York Al-Karam, supra note 168 (petitioning the APA to take an 
official position on CVE). 
 178 See As a Doctor, I Refuse to Spy on My Patients, supra note 74 (warning that the obligations 
of British health care professionals subject to the Prevent Duty will lead to the destruction of health 
institutions); LoCicero & Boyd, supra note 24 (“We will not spy on our patients. We do not read 
minds, and we know that none of us can predict the future.”); see also Access California Services et 
al., Letter on Objections to DHS’s Fiscal Year 2016 Countering Violent Extremism Grant Program 
(Aug. 31, 2016) (voicing concerns from organizations including the National Association of Social 
Workers about the CVE grant program). 
 179 AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 90, at 1 (Principle III) (articulating a physician’s 
responsibility to “seek changes in those [legal] requirements which are contrary to the best interests of 
the patient”); see Access California Services et al., supra note 178 (advocating against the Department 
of Homeland Security CVE grant program); APA Advocacy Issues, APA, http://www.apa.org/about/
gr/issues/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/4PXK-ZVDH] (listing topics on which the APA engages in 
advocacy, including “health disparities,” “peer review,” and “human rights issues”); Gerada, supra 
note 74 (arguing for advocacy from a medical professional association, despite British health profes-
sionals’ inability to exercise free choice regarding participation in CVE). 
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scientific expertise and commitment to patient well-being, these professional 
associations should use their influence to speak out about the lack of sound 
evidence underlying CVE and the various harms it inflicts.180 
B. Incorporating Protections Against CVE Into Codes of Ethics 
In addition to discouraging members’ participation in CVE and advocat-
ing for its discontinuation, professional associations should take steps to mini-
mize harm to patients receiving services through CVE programs.181 First, they 
should require mental health professionals providing services through CVE 
programs to make their patients aware of CVE’s counter-terrorism aims and its 
funding sources.182 Some associations already require that health professionals 
communicate the limits of confidentiality to patients.183 For example, where 
specific limitations to confidentiality exist, the APA requires that psychologists 
obtain informed consent from patients receiving services.184 Considering 
CVE’s ties to counter-terrorism and the broad national security exceptions 
within federal privacy laws, it is crucial that patients be informed of the unique 
risks of receiving treatment through such programs.185 
                                                                                                                           
 180 See Donald M. Bersoff, Autonomy for Vulnerable Populations: The Supreme Court’s Reckless 
Disregard for Self-Determination and Social Science, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1569, 1574–75 (1992) (dis-
cussing the role the APA has historically played in advocating on behalf of vulnerable individuals in 
legal settings, based on the APA’s expertise in methodologically sound science); Dorothy Shaw, Ad-
vocacy, the Role of Health Professional Associations, 127 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS S43, 
S43 (2014) (arguing that advocacy is a fitting and appropriate activity in which medical professional 
associations should engage, particularly considering their “significant evidence-based expertise”); 
Rogers H. Wright, The American Psychological Association and the Rise of Advocacy, 23 PROF. PSY-
CHOL. RES. & PRAC. 443, 443 (1992) (summarizing the history of the APA’s advocacy involvement). 
 181 See APA ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 90, at 3–4 (articulating the value of “tak[ing] care 
to do no harm”); OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 24, at 65–106 (documenting cases in 
which students and patients were discriminated against by helping professionals subject to the Prevent 
Duty). 
 182 See APA ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 90, at 7 (Standard 4.02) (requiring psychologists to 
discuss the limits of confidentiality with patients); NASW CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 153, at 12 
(Standard 1.07(e)) (requiring social workers to discuss confidentiality rights and limitations with cli-
ents); PATEL & KOUSHIK, supra note 33, at 13 (highlighting the confidentiality concerns CVE raises). 
 183 See, e.g., APA ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 90, at 7 (Standard 4.02); NASW CODE OF 
ETHICS, supra note 153, at 12 (Standard 1.07(e)). 
 184 APA ETHICAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 90, at 7 (Standard 3.10). 
 185 See 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012) (permitting disclosure of private business records if ordered as 
part of an investigation related to foreign or domestic terrorism); 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(k)(2) (2017) 
(permitting disclosure of PHI under HIPAA in certain situations related to national security or intelli-
gence activities); CAGE, CONSENT DENIED: HOW PREVENT QUESTIONS CHILDREN WITHOUT PAREN-
TAL INVOLVEMENT 5 (2016) (discussing how British children are questioned under Prevent without 
their families’ knowledge of or consent to potential breaches of confidentiality). See generally Ward, 
supra note 91 (exploring the legal possibilities for information-sharing among law enforcement and 
mental health professionals participating in CVE). 
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Second, professional associations should set clear standards regarding the 
Tarasoff duty and CVE.186 In particular, they should specify that, unless sup-
posed risk “indicators” are clearly linked to violence, as opposed to ideology, 
they do not trigger the Tarasoff duty.187 Additionally, they should strongly state 
that any risk assessment tool that is not based on sound science should not 
predicate disclosure of confidential information.188 Third, professional associa-
tions should review and comment on the scientific methods involved in the 
development of any risk assessment tools purporting to measure “vulnerability 
to radicalization.”189 
Finally, professional associations should emphasize that reprogramming in-
dividuals’ religious and political beliefs is not the business of mental health pro-
fessionals.190 They should therefore enact strict guidelines prohibiting referrals 
of patients to CVE intervention programs based on their supposed “vulnerability 
to radicalization.”191 While CVE is promoted as providing off-ramps, experience 
in the United States and abroad shows that it stigmatizes communities and sub-
                                                                                                                           
 186 See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976) (establishing a mental 
health professional’s duty to warn third parties); LoCicero & Boyd, supra note 24 (distinguishing 
between the Tarasoff duty and the expectations of mental health professionals participating in CVE); 
Ward, supra note 91, at 60 (explaining how the work of mental health professionals participating in 
CVE activities always involves the difficult balancing of confidentiality and public safety inherent in 
Tarasoff). 
 187 See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340 (recognizing a duty to warn only where a “patient presents a 
serious danger of violence”); PATEL & KOUSHIK, supra note 33, at 9–11 (explaining how CVE con-
flates ideology and violence). 
 188 See PATEL & KOUSHIK, supra note 33, at 9–11 (criticizing CVE’s lack of a sound scientific 
foundation); QURESHI, supra note 50, at 26–33 (criticizing the methodology used to develop the ERG 
22+ CVE risk assessment tool); Ross, supra note 122 (discussing a letter signed by 140 academics and 
experts criticizing the methodology in the development of the ERG 22+ tool). 
 189 See QURESHI, supra note 50, at 26–33. Mental health professionals’ rejection of questionable 
risk assessment techniques may impact the weight these tests are afforded in legal settings. See Daub-
ert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (stating that “[w]idespread acceptance can 
be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible”); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 
1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (requiring that a scientific method be accepted by practitioners in the relevant 
scientific field for it to be admissible as evidence); Hana Church, Comment, Prisoner Denied Sex 
Reassignment Surgery: The First Circuit Ignores Medical Consensus in Kosilek v. Spencer, 57 B.C. 
L. REV. E. SUPP. 17, 21 (2016) (explaining how consensus of experts within a professional field influ-
ences the weight given to scientific evidence). 
 190 See Political Dissent, APA, COUNCIL POLICY MANUAL, CHAPTER XII. PUBLIC INTEREST 
(1972), http://www.apa.org/about/policy/chapter-12.aspx#political-dissent [https://perma.cc/2GJV-
PQUU] (stating the APA’s opposition to the pathologization of political dissent); see also Aziz, supra 
note 18 (describing the purpose of CVE as “stop[ping] people from embracing extreme beliefs”); 
Rascoff, supra note 17 (explaining that the goal of CVE is “to interfere with each individual’s radical-
ization process or to unwind it if it has already taken root” and that CVE techniques may include “in-
culcation of ‘mainstream’ religious beliefs”). 
 191 See APA Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice, Evidence-Based Practice in 
Psychology, 61 AM. PSYCHOL. 271, 273 (2006) (discussing “psychology’s fundamental commitment 
to sophisticated evidence-based psychological practice”); LoCicero & Boyd, supra note 24 (calling on 
mental health professionals to refrain from any form of participation in CVE). 
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jects participants to lengthy legal struggles and psychological harm.192 Khan’s 
story, moreover, illustrates the long-term consequences for patients whose men-
tal health care has a law enforcement component.193 Given the lack of empirical 
evidence for CVE as a violence prevention program, professional associations 
should prohibit voluntary referrals to CVE intervention programs.194 
It should be noted that professional codes of conduct are not an adequate 
replacement for laws protecting civil and human rights.195 When ethical obli-
gations conflict with legal duties, mental health professionals are not held to 
clear standards.196 They must engage in a complex balancing of their legal and 
ethical duties as well as possible professional, civil, or criminal consequences 
of their actions.197 It is nonetheless essential that mental health professionals 
commit to collectively defending their patients’ civil and human rights and the 
integrity of their profession.198 Revising professional codes of conduct is one 
way to ensure that health professionals know what is required of them, that 
lawmakers are put on notice when policies conflict with clear ethical stand-
ards, and that patients receive safe and dignified care.199 
                                                                                                                           
 192 See OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 24 (discussing the harmful impacts of Pre-
vent); QURESHI, supra note 50, at 44–47 (summarizing a series of cases in UK family court concern-
ing “vulnerability to radicalization”); Aziz, supra note 14, at 264 (describing how CVE “breed[s] 
distrust and divisiveness within Muslim communities”); Beydoun, supra note 15, at 1467, 1483 (dis-
cussing how CVE threatens civil rights and “endorses and mainstreams” Islamophobia). 
 193 See Hussain, supra note 1 (discussing the FBI’s involvement in Khan’s mental health treat-
ment and criminal prosecution). 
 194 See APA Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice, supra note 191 (discussing 
psychologists’ commitment to evidence-based practice); Huq, supra note 43, at 56–60 (describing 
methodological weaknesses in the foundational studies underlying the development of CVE); LoCice-
ro & Boyd, supra note 24 (calling for mental health professionals’ non-participation in CVE). 
 195 See Merriam, supra note 149, at 204–06 (discussing how, in situations where ethics provide 
stronger safeguards than laws, health professionals are not afforded sufficient power to protect those 
in their care); see also Marks, supra note 146, at 724 (explaining that health professionals are faced 
with ethical and legal ambiguities when their codes of ethics reflect inconsistently interpreted interna-
tional legal norms). 
 196 See Marks, supra note 146, at 724. 
 197 See Merriam, supra note 149, at 217–21 (discussing the professional, criminal, and civil risks 
faced by health professionals practicing in an environment in which legal and ethical obligations con-
flict). 
 198 See Marks, supra note 146 (arguing that adapting codes of ethics to account for rights abuses 
is necessary “if health professionals are to retain our trust, and if they are to maintain the social and 
cultural status engendered by their perceived humanitarian ethos”). 
 199 See Daniel N. Lermen, Second Opinion: Inconsistent Deference to Medical Ethics in Death 
Penalty Jurisprudence, 95 GEO. L.J. 1941, 1977–78 (2006) (arguing for increased judicial deference 
to medical ethics in cases dealing with “the intersection of medical ethics and constitutional law”); 
Marks, supra note 146, at 730 (mentioning that reforms to some codes of ethics have been intended to 
provide a tool that “legally and practically” enables non-participation in unethical activities); Steven 
H. Miles & Alfred M. Freedman, Medical Ethics and Torture: Revising the Declaration of Tokyo, 373 
LANCET 344, 347 (2009) (advocating for ethical reforms considering that governments who engage in 
torture with impunity rely on medical professionals’ complicity). 
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CONCLUSION 
CVE is based on unsound science and the biased assumption that ideolo-
gy and religion are at the root of terrorism. CVE harms targeted populations by 
dividing communities, causing distrust in health care systems, and criminaliz-
ing the mentally ill and developmentally disabled. Although state and federal 
laws and professional ethics codes provide some protections, exceptions per-
mit lawful disclosures of private patient information, particularly when linked 
to national security and public safety. Given the lack of sufficiently robust pa-
tient privacy protections, mental health professionals can play an important 
role in safeguarding rights by pressuring their professional associations to re-
vise their codes of ethical conduct. Professional associations should urge 
members to refrain from participating in CVE and from making referrals to 
CVE programs. At the very least, mental health professionals should be obli-
gated to ensure that patients receiving services through a CVE program are 
made fully aware of the aims and potential harms of such programs. Moreover, 
by commenting publicly about the lack of sound science underlying CVE and 
the ways in which CVE threatens access to mental health care, professional 
associations can play a crucial role in defending the rights and dignity of their 
patients. 
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